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Abstract: 
 
In terms of intervening in embodied experience, medical treatment is wonder-ful in its 
ambition and its metaphysical presumption; yet wonder’s role in clinical medicine has 
received little philosophical attention. In this paper I propose the value, to doctors and 
others in routine clinical life, of an openness to wonder and to the sense of wonder.  
 
Key to this is the identity of the central ethical challenges for most clinicians, being not the 
high-tech drama of popular conceptions of medical ethics but rather the routine of patients’ 
undramatic but unremitting demands for the clinician’s time and respectful attention. 
Wonder (conceived as an intense and transfiguring attentiveness) offers: an alternative and 
ubiquitous ethical source in place of the more familiar respect for rational autonomy; a 
source of renewal galvanising diagnostic imagination; and a timely recalling of the embodied 
agency of both patient and clinician. 
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Wonder and the clinical encounter 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Here are three writers not thinking particularly about medicine: 
 
Were there no given, wonder could never spring on us its unpredictable 
surprise, would never be able to sneak up and startle us into realizing that we 
do not know what lies right here in front of us. Jerome Miller [1] 
 
Wonder … always points to something beyond the accepted rules. Because of 
this, the feeling of being overwhelmed, or the experience of humbleness and 
even awe could accompany it. But wonder is also consistent with a certain 
uneasiness towards the given, an inkling that there is more to it than 
tradition admits, and this more can be investigated. Paul Martin Opdal [2] 
 
If this is the way the world is: extraordinary, surprising, beautiful, singular, 
mysterious and meaningful; then this is how I ought to act in that world: with 
respect and celebration, with care, and with full acceptance of the 
responsibilities that come with my role as a human being privileged to be a 
part of that community of living things. Wonder is the missing premise that 
can transform what-is into a moral conviction about how one ought to act in 
that world. Kathleen Dean Moore [3]  
 
These writers had in mind, variously, questions in philosophy of religion, in 
developmental and educational psychology, and ecology and environmental ethics; 
but I believe their common theme – wonder – is always latent within medicine and 
at times suffuses it. Indeed, there is a sense in which all medical treatment, whether 
or not it works, is wonder-ful in terms of its ambition and, for want of a better word, 
its metaphysical presumption.[4] For many, a major reason for entering the 
profession of medicine is the mystery of the body and its physiological 
interconnectedness. [Footnote 1] Yet for some reason wonder’s role in clinical 
medicine is rarely spoken about. 
 
In this paper I want to propose the value, to doctors and others in routine clinical 
life, of an active, cultivated, openness to wonder and to the sense of wonder. 
Wonder is a notion that in recent decades has attracted periodic interest among 
philosophers and theologians, [5-10] historians of science [11-13] and 
educationalists [14] among others (including recently at least one significant funding 
                                                     
1 I owe this point to APS Hungin. 
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body [footnote 2]) but so far as I know it has not been discussed in detail in relation 
to the practice of clinical medicine. An invitation to do so was issued in the form of 
an elegantly engaging short paper by sociologist Arthur W Frank, exhorting doctors 
and patients alike to ‘recognize the wonder of the body rather than try to control 
it;’[15] and for my own part I have previously suggested an active sense of a wonder 
as a personal resource to the professional clinician [16] and its cultivation as an 
educational good to be aimed at via the integration of humanities within the medical 
school curriculum.[17] However no-one has attempted any sustained analytic 
discussion of the clinical relevance of wonder, nor exploration of the ethical or 
aesthetic aspects of wonder in relation to medical practice from the perspective of 
either clinician or patient. Yet the attention that wonder has received in other 
discourses including those concerned with human nature and flourishing, the active 
imagination, and the nature and development of science – all of which converge 
somewhat upon the goals and practice of the medical consultation – justifies its 
being considered in relation to clinical medicine. I aim to begin that consideration in 
this paper, which mainly concerns wonder’s benefits to the clinician but inter alia 
recognises some of the phenomenology and dynamics of an active sense of wonder, 
something that I think springs naturally from the clinical encounter where, regularly, 
some of the most intense of human experiences are acknowledged, reviewed, or 
prefigured. 
 
Clinical life: moral routine, extraordinary responsibility 
 
Certainly, some medical contexts involving the drama, the high stakes and the 
conceptual challenges of dizzying technological interventions at the extremities of 
life – the survival of very low birth weight babies or of multiple trauma victims, or 
the recipients of combined organ transplantation – may provoke an almost too-
obvious, too-banal recognition of ‘modern wonders’. But this is not at all what I have 
in mind. I am thinking instead of the routine, everyday, hurly-burly of clinical life at 
its least glamorous, where the intellectual and ethical challenges are taxing precisely 
because, devoid of drama and obscured from the popular gaze, they are 
foreseeable, unremitting, and unsung. 
 
In these contexts the phenomena most apparent to the doctor – a succession of 
patients mostly with routine signs, symptoms and stories – do not seem remarkable 
or even unusual; they provoke little surprise, they will be increasingly familiar as the 
doctor’s experience lengthens, and they gradually constitute the ‘staple diet’ of the 
doctor’s work. In precisely that guise, they bring challenges. 
 
First, clinical life involves endless demands for, in effect, emotional support from 
doctors for needy patients whose underlying problems may often not even be 
primarily biomedical. This is a key part of what is certainly the most widespread, and 
arguably the most intractable, manifestation of the problem of resource allocation, 
                                                     
2 The Templeton Foundation in 2010 issued a call for research into the 
understanding of awe and wonder. 
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that is, the fair distribution of clinicians’ time, expertise and attention among many 
more patients than they can possibly satisfy if their responses are to be full and 
sensitive. The alternatives clinicians face are to do less than full justice to all, or to 
defer to some patients whilst neglecting others. This is the ‘small change’ of moral 
life in the clinical context, but because it is unremitting it consumes the doctor’s 
moral reserves more surely than do the high-profile dramas. Moreover it is the arena 
in which the clinician’s humanity is, over time, cumulatively most tested and most 
abraded. The dramatic patient encounter is exceptional. The non-dramatic patient is 
unremarkable. The unremarkable patient becomes routine. The routine patient 
becomes uninteresting. How does one respond fully and attentively to an 
uninteresting patient – a patient from whom the telling details that would otherwise 
make him distinctively individual and memorable (and hence compellingly time-
worthy) have been blurred or attenuated by what we might call ‘patient-centred 
tedium’? 
 
Second, seeing a succession of patients with similar symptoms that are consistent 
with a single or common diagnosis is bound to channel the doctor’s mind in certain 
directions. Each succeeding patient who appears to fit the pattern will tend to 
attract that diagnosis and, moreover, add weight to the emerging pattern. Yet the 
doctor has always to remain alert to the possibility that the patient in front of her 
right now is different, and significant consequences may hang on this. The symptoms 
of an upper respiratory tract infection may mask underlying pneumonia – yet for 
some time the patient may simply resemble others diagnosed with pharyngitis. Or 
alternatively the patient may not be one of a series of similar cases of acute illness 
but may have presented repeatedly for the successful symptomatic relief of a 
chronic problem; many times the same, but perhaps this time is different. The 
successful relief of heartburn through medication may be a concurrent blessing for 
the patient yet might also obscure an underlying cancer. In either of these kinds of 
case, delayed diagnosis (or, still worse, a diagnosis that is missed altogether) can 
severely endanger the patient, yet it can arise from the doctor’s noticing in the 
individual patient the very constellations of resemblances whose patterns, emerging 
in countless collective observations over time, first led to the identification of those 
diseases and the refinement of those diagnoses. The patient’s history, his symptom 
duration, treatment response, his own perceptions, fears and expectations are all 
vital; but the recognition of patterns is also a diagnostically vital skill.[18] Somehow 
the doctor must be guided in judgement by the accumulated experience of ‘cases’ 
that genuinely belong together, whilst remaining free to see a fractionally yet 
crucially different ‘case’ for what it is. What intellectual and imaginative resources 
are at the doctor’s side here? 
 
Third, attentive history taking and imaginative and alert diagnosis bring 
consequences of their own; and if more is involved than ‘watchful waiting’ then the 
consequences essentially mean a physical intervention in terms of the medicinal 
(and perhaps surgical) management of the patient. Our nature as embodied 
creatures means that our experience of ourselves – as flourishing, languishing or 
withering – is grounded in and reflects our fleshly state.[19] It is, typically, a 
disturbance in our experience that sends us to our doctor. It is, typically, through 
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interventions in our physical bodies that doctors try to annul or ameliorate the 
disturbances, and to restore our experience to its pre-morbid range of possibility. 
Although the enterprise of physical treatments is familiar to the point of routine, any 
significant therapy is still a colossal responsibility (recognised by the stringency with 
which society licenses practitioners and medicines), and one that is intensified by the 
technology upon which modern medicine is increasingly dependent – ‘meddling in 
the flesh’ of patients, with good purpose but uncertain outcomes, is not only a 
physical but an existential undertaking.[20] This privilege of access to the patient’s 
frail flesh, and the jealously-guarded licence to intervene in it, carries a heady 
obligation and one that must at some time or other daunt every clinical practitioner. 
(I would go so far as to say I would prefer not to be treated by anyone who had not 
at some time felt so daunted.) When, from time to time, her training, experience and 
vocation do not feel sufficient to the burden, what else can offer the doctor both the 
courage and the humility she needs to propose and signpost a burdensome physical 
and emotional path that, in the long run, only the patient and not the doctor herself 
can actually walk? 
 
It is to the meeting of these extraordinary responsibilities that, I think, a sense of 
wonder may bring new resources. 
 
What is wonder? 
 
I have not yet said what I mean by ‘wonder’. Wonder is more than one thing, of 
course, and any one of those things is better captured by a constellation of ideas 
than by any attempted synonym (and those who are unsympathetic to my overall 
purposes may begin by being unhappy with my version of wonder.) 
 
So, in the present paper I am concerned with wonder’s characterising a special kind 
of transfiguring encounter between us and something other than us. Wonder is a 
very particular attitude of special attentiveness (very much an attitude rather than 
an emotion) that arises within us, an attitude prompted by circumstances that may 
be entirely ordinary yet, through our active and responsive imagination, yield an 
object in which the ordinary is transfigured by and suffused with something 
extraordinary as well. The attitude of wonder is thus one of altered, compellingly-
intensified attention to something that we immediately acknowledge as somehow 
important – something that might be unexpected, that in its fullest sense we 
certainly do not yet understand, and towards which we will likely want to turn our 
faculty of understanding; something whose initial appearance to us engages our 
imagination before our understanding; something at that moment larger and more 
significant than ourselves; something in the face of which we momentarily set aside 
our own concerns (and even our self-conscious awareness, in the most powerful 
instances). 
 
Some related ideas ‘cohabit’ with wonder in our imagination, and wonder 
sometimes involves them, but must be distinguished from them nonetheless. 
Wonder is not the same as awe: its object need be neither sublime nor terrifying. It 
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is closer to marvelling; yet it is not confined to static gazing but has its own dynamic, 
leading on to the desire to understand. It has pale echoes in curiosity; but its objects 
persist in our imagination, even beyond the point where we have at one level 
explained them. It stands in relation to explanation rather as bumping into someone 
in the street stands in relation to conversing with them – though with greater 
gravity, greater concern and, in the moment, usually greater delight. 
 
Now I am here giving a freestanding characterisation of wonder as I experience it, 
but since many have written on the matter already I am bound to be selective with 
regard to either endorsing or disputing prior sources. Among these, some have 
found wondering to be, variously: an essential characteristic of man;[21] ‘a strong 
emotional experience containing elements of ideation and disposition to act;’[22] 
the acceptance of ‘in some small degree the play of the imagination;’[23] something 
that is generally good or excellent;[24] ‘an experience of the self’ that is not yet an 
attitude but that gropes towards one;[25] susceptible to capacity or ‘talent;’[26] 
disinterested, external and detaching us from our ordinary world;[27] ‘a crisis;’[28] 
‘ineffable;’[29] an interruption that is embodied and physical;[30] purely passive;[31] 
a ‘hinge’ upon which turns the door to other worlds;[32] something full of 
‘unpredictable surprise;’[33] an ‘eruption of the numinous in human life;’[34] 
something capable of ‘arous[ing] and inflict[ing] terror, worship and grief;’[35] the 
converse of generosity;[36] an acknowledgment of difference in others;[37] a state 
of mind signalling the limits of understanding;[38] openness or receptivity leading 
one beyond a preoccupation with the self ‘into a search for meaning beyond 
oneself;’[39] and the ‘keystone virtue in our time of reckless destruction, a source of 
decency and hope and restraint.’[40] 
 
With some of these I joyfully agree; with some I resolutely do not. The application of 
wonder that I am here urging into clinical life is the constellation of first-person ideas 
given above, centring around an attitude of special, intense, preparatory, 
transfiguring attentiveness to what may be revealed as extraordinary. Other 
constellations may be found, with different endorsements – or correctives – among 
the other sources briefly noted here; the precise constellation matters less than the 
goal of its being engaged with clinical life. 
 
And so now let us bring our thoughts on wonder, whatever their sources and their 
inflexion, to the challenges of high responsibility found amid clinical routine. 
 
Response (i): wonder as an ethical source 
 
Effective treatments, like other good things, do not cease to be good by becoming 
commonplace, but as Parsons has noted they do tend to lose their interest.[41] They 
pass into the realm of the routine, in which curiosity is dulled by familiarity, a source 
of deadly staleness for the practitioner. 
 
Yet the medically unremarkable patient is at the same time a remarkably rich ethical 
challenge. Recall that the ‘small change’ of clinical ethical life concerns the fair and 
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effective distribution of the doctor’s time and attention to all her patients. All 
patients are, whatever else they are, the loci of a special vulnerability that 
commands our moral regard, and they are also particular instances of human 
embodiment which, as I will argue later in more detail, is itself intrinsically 
wonderful.  Thus regardless of characteristics, the doctor’s ten-thousandth patient 
needs and deserves the same recognition of his common humanity, and the same 
hushed acknowledgement of his tender fragility, as does her first patient. These 
needs inhere in all patients equally, and regardless of their personal qualities: they 
belong to the courteous patient and to the rude patient; the engaging and the aloof; 
the attractive and the repellent; the compliant and the rebellious; the grateful and 
the resentful; the prudent and the absurdly demanding; the interesting and the dull. 
 
Each of these contrasts includes a challenge to the clinician’s patience, but I am 
particularly concerned with the patient whose challenge consists in his being simply 
unremarkable. It is simply not his fault that his particular complaint and symptoms 
bring to the clinical consultation the full weight of demand for the doctor’s moral 
regard, along with little or none of the intellectual or imaginative stimulation that 
might have made that regard more spontaneous. The unremarkable patient offers 
no obviously deep or rewarding challenges – he simply contributes his own needs to 
the accumulated clinical workload. He turns up in the consulting room in large 
numbers, and his needs, rightly, count in full. Cumulatively, making respectful time 
for him, day in day out, is the central ethical challenge in any clinical practice 
constrained by the doctor’s time, energy and attentiveness. [Footnote 3] 
 
Sustained moral attention and respectfulness within a routine requires us to be open 
to (and sometimes to look for) that which can call to us, or captivate us; it requires 
the doctor to be mindful of what is at stake for the patient, rather than for her need 
for professional gratification (and, when disappointed, for her consequent sense of 
tedium). How then can one continue to hear strong ethical callings from within such 
confined imaginative spaces (confined, that is, in an intellectual and perhaps 
aesthetic sense)? 
 
Interwoven with this problem of sheer same-ness is another – the problem of where 
we ground the basis of respecting people. The orthodox autonomist basis of respect 
for persons [42-45] is tied so closely to the notion of the person as rational agent 
that ethically difficult cases tend to be seen precisely as the exceptions, as the 
departures from the norm, as diminutions of full autonomy and rationality. However 
whilst this may seem a plausible picture of the moral challenges in the dramatic 
scenarios of heroic medical ethics, it is a poor picture of the more pervasive moral 
challenge of clinical tedium. Here it is not the departures from the norm but rather 
                                                     
3 Medical ethics is not a technical species of morality; it is ordinary moral life, 
essentially inter-personal, carried on in the particular circumstances of the clinical 
encounter. Only those circumstances and their attendant purposes differentiate it, in 
this sense, from the ethics of other forms of personal consultation, such as those 
involving a lawyer, a counselor, a priest or a teacher; and of course each of these 
faces the problems of reconciling routine with engaged personal respect. 
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the very adherence to the norm, the very usual-ness of routine cases, that impedes 
our full respectful attention. 
 
Yet it need not be seen like this at all. Briefly to anticipate the burden of Section (iii) 
below, key aspects of human embodiment can (indeed, should) be recognised as 
wonderful, most especially the emergence of conscious experience and intelligent 
agency from the complexity with which lifeless particles are combined to yield our 
flesh. This incredible constitution is shared by us all, and can inspire wonder 
wherever it is found. Thus a basis for respect for patients can lie partly in the wonder 
of embodiment – something that is held to the full by every patient, however 
impaired. The ‘tedious’ patient is tedious in relation to the existential and 
interpersonal realm; but as an object of wonder his own embodiment is 
undiminished. As a patient, Arthur Frank recognises this universality of wonder even 
in the varieties of illness: 
 
Wonder is almost always possible; control may not be. If the ill person can 
focus on an ideal of wonder in place of control, then living in a diseased body 
can recover some of its joy. [46] 
 
The challenge is for the clinician to be able to access this same resource in the 
service of maintaining respectful attentiveness under pressure. The characteristics of 
wonder and wondering that make wonder ‘almost always possible’ are, I think, 
found in the way that an attitude of intense attention and an active, responsive 
imagination can transfigure the ordinary. Wonder’s dynamic springboard, from initial 
stasis into the desire to understand, has I believe an ethical as well as an 
intellectual/diagnostic or an imaginative/aesthetic dimension. Or, better, ethical 
attention is also intellectual and imaginative. The attitude of wonder allows the 
routine patient to be made present to the doctor in a new and compelling way: 
present, in his embodiment, as another representation of life’s enduring and 
marvellous mystery. 
 
Wonder defeats routine and tedium also through its being an outward, other-
regarding gaze. In wonder we set aside our concerns with the self: wonder is among 
other things a momentary self-deferral. We attend to wonder’s object for its sake, 
not for ours.[47] Where wonder’s object is another person, then that person’s ‘sake’ 
is (whatever else it is) an ethical concern, and it frames the wondering in ethical 
terms. Of course wonder is not wholly self-abnegating; the desire to understand 
returns our attention to ourselves eventually, and our delight in understanding must 
involve some self-awareness. Yet although the experience of delight must refer back 
to the self at some level, it would be corrupted if it became itself the object of 
attention. [Footnote 4] This diminishment of the self tends towards humility; in this 
way wonder becomes a clear source of the ethical.[49] (The diminished self is still a 
                                                     
4 Compare CS Lewis’s distinction between ‘enjoyment’ (as active wholehearted 
engagement) and ‘contemplation’ (as self-conscious, knowing, distanced reflection) 
in: Lewis [48] 
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self, of course; indeed humility requires a certain mindfulness of the self as 
diminished. A completely dispersed or discarded self could not even be humble.) 
 
 
 
Lastly on this point, routine may become particularly threatening through its being 
institutionalised. Perhaps especially, though not uniquely, publicly-funded 
healthcare systems institutionalise routine – partly in acceptance of the structural 
imbalance between patients’ excess needs and doctors’ limited time and energy. 
Simone Weil regarded the factory as the ultimate oppressive circumstance,[50] and 
although institutionalised healthcare is not quite yet a factory, it is sometimes (like 
education) complained of in those terms. [Footnote 5] The term ‘alienation’ comes 
irresistibly to mind in such a context, and weary clinical routine can provoke 
alienation as it tends towards the condition of other forms of production line. The 
clinician, constrained by pressure of time and dissatisfied, discouraged, even 
disengaged through a sense of superficial repetition, risks becoming (as do other 
production-line workers), externalised from her work and diminished as an ethically-
engaged self. Yet as we noted, wonder, too, involves a kind of abnegation, a 
diminishment, of the self. In alienation the diminishment is harmful because it 
merely increases the distance between the agent and object of ethical action. In 
wonder, the diminishment does the opposite: it removes the distance between 
object and agent by displacing the agent’s concerns with herself (and with them, 
some of her sense of dissatisfaction with routine or superficiality). In wonder, 
inattention is replaced by close and mindful attention (something we shall consider 
further in the following section). The wondering self sets self aside, for the moment, 
and as a result is the more closely-engaged with what she wonders at. In this sense 
wonder redemptively opposes alienation, re-engaging the clinician with what is 
otherwise merely familiar, merely routine. 
 
  
Response (ii): wonder and diagnostic imagination  
 
In the quest for good management of the patient, diagnosis is an important enabling 
goal; classification in turn is its conceptual cornerstone. Into which pre-existing 
diagnostic category does the present patient’s problem fall? Classification is a logical 
requirement of language as such: how can we refer to anything whatever except as 
this particular example of a general kind of thing (or event, or aspect, or 
circumstance)? But it is a psychological need as well: how else do we stabilise 
ourselves except by affirming that these are our circumstances, these are the 
challenges facing us, this is what needs to be done? Both logical and psychological 
needs take on a particular form and intensity in the clinical encounter. The patient’s 
need for explanation and prediction concerning his very bodily self, and the doctor’s 
need to respond with an exploratory model, must be assuaged first through the 
doctor’s knowledge. But that knowledge consists in fitting the particulars of the 
                                                     
5 I owe this point to Simon Walker. 
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patient in front of her into an extraordinary classificatory matrix – the highly 
elaborate and hugely congested space of subdivisions of a single object that is the 
body of the patient, albeit qualified by the past and present circumstances of a 
material and interpersonal environment. Seemingly adjacent classifications jostle for 
elbow-room in terms of discernibility within the clinician’s field of attention. 
[Footnote 6] 
 
Upon the correct classification hang the prospects for producing a satisfying 
explanation for what is awry, and for lining up the treatment that might set things 
straight. The stakes can be very high, with the price of failure being paid physically by 
the patient but morally and psychologically by the clinician. Somehow the doctor 
must be guided in judgement by accumulated experience of ‘cases’ that genuinely 
belong together – pattern recognition is a diagnostically vital skill – whilst remaining 
free to see beyond the expected classification and discern a fractionally yet crucially 
different ‘case’ for what it is. What intellectual and imaginative resources are at the 
doctor’s side here? 
 
The clinician’s primary intellectual and perceptual resources for discerning the 
proper classification come from her training and experience – the very resources 
that, of course, define the task of diagnosis (and its attendant decision-making and 
management) in the first place, and frame the differential alternatives facing her. 
Her pre-requisites in terms of knowledge and skills are to be found in the 
scientifically-grounded principles and practices of her profession. But she needs also 
to be able to stand aside, to view aslant: to let her imagination be the unseen 
comradely sceptic at her elbow. 
 
A sense of wonder grows out of a grasp of the ordinary, of ordinary relations, 
expected meanings, assumed explanations, things that are in themselves seemingly 
non-curious. Things may provoke sometimes because they are indeed wholly-
unexplained, but sometimes also because they are merely almost-explained. An 
active, playful imagination invites us to seek for other meanings, other patterns, 
from those we know already; a responsible intellect grounds the playfulness in the 
practical requirements of the situation. A habitual openness to wonder can enable 
her to bring imagination to her clinical vision, in part by fertilising the seed of 
curiosity: 
 
Wonder retains an element of detachment or ideation, a minimal curiosity, a 
control of emotion that gives psychic distance to the event and permits at 
least in some small degree the play of imagination.[51] 
 
The essential thing here is to be able to see beyond established patterns, especially 
those that have become routinised by the very inductive processes that ordinarily 
make classifications possible and probabilities meaningful. The accumulation and 
repetition that are implicit in anything properly called ‘a practice’ have ambiguous 
                                                     
6 Not least, there is the problem that symptoms can become typical for age rather 
than arising from unexpected pathology. I owe this point to APS Hungin. 
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consequences. Familiarity makes possible not only fluency and skill but also 
casualness and disregard. Balancing the repetition of skilful action, against sensitivity 
to what is new in the particular, is a tough task. A well-attuned, wide-awake sense of 
wonder holds open the mind’s doors to delightful surprise, but it also guards those 
same doors against complacency and numbness precisely because it can – must – 
wait at one’s elbow in the routine cases where surprise seems to have evaporated. 
As Parsons puts it: 
 
The wonderful is any object of any wondering, excited interest. So far as a 
person’s perceptions, activities and meanings are not entirely routinized and 
stereotyped, so that he responds to the unique qualities and forms of things, 
then in principle every particular occurrence may become an object of 
surprise and curiosity for him, i.e., something wonderful in greater or lesser 
degree.[52] 
 
In wonder, objects and circumstances can become newly present to us, and in more 
vivid ways; our perceptions are subtly intensified and made alive to that which is 
subtly different; we attend intently to the previously-unnoticed among what was 
expected. 
 
But, then, what to do with the newly-noticed? 
 
The essential thing is to retain it in the imagination past the point where curiosity 
dwindles. As Fuller suggests, wonder ‘excites our ontological imaginations’, leading 
us to seek deeper patterns in the universe.[53] But these need not be the 
dramatically deeper, concerning whole fields of enquiry in their generality – as in 
tectonic plate movement, in natural selection, in the mathematics of fractals just 
about everywhere in nature. Wonder is still, I think, at play in finding merely subtly-
deeper ways of attending to the nearly-understood, having only particular scope. 
 
In habitual openness to wonder, we learn to understand the particular in its own 
right. Putting these things in the right words is not easy, and is a matter deserving 
careful thought elsewhere. Here we can at least say that our ability to see new 
patterns – a key basis, surely, of hypothesis formation in bioscience and clinical 
diagnosis alike – has its edges sharpened by co-existing with a sense of wonder. But 
in addition – as I will try to explore a little further in the next section, there is a 
deeper obscurity of understanding concerning the mystery of embodied human 
nature as such; and this surely is always at stake in the clinical encounter. 
 
Response (iii): wonder underlying embodiment 
 
The third challenge of moral routine in clinical life concerns responsibility for the 
experiential consequences of treatment. We have recognised this ‘meddling in the 
flesh’ of patients as not only a physical but an existential undertaking, carrying a 
daunting burden of responsibility. When the doctor’s training, experience and 
vocation are not in themselves enough to support it, what can justifiably embolden 
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the doctor to initiate the (perhaps burdensome) physical and emotional travail that 
only the patient must or can directly undergo? 
 
Powerful help lies in recognising our embodied nature as enduringly worthy of 
‘clinical wonder’: for as both the object of wonder and the ground of wondering 
experience, human embodiment is central to the clinical gaze. This brings both 
challenges and consolations. Consider first what we might call the anatomy of 
experience.[54] Our bodies make our worlds just as in turn they are made by those 
worlds. Their shapes, sizes and functionalities make possible and also limit what we 
can do. But our actions are also mysterious to us, even when the whole 
neurophysiological story has been laid bare, concerning the material links in the 
physical chains of events that we can see and describe. When for instance I use my 
hands to type these words, they act in the world yet I have not the faintest 
conception of how my thoughts and intentions, in terms of the words that I want to 
type, can possibly launch the accomplishments of my hands, in terms of sequences 
of keystrokes correctly delivered. More generally (and to put the point in inevitably 
dualist-sounding terms) I do not have – and it seems to me that I cannot have – any 
true and deep knowledge of how my will is manifest in physical action. Equally, 
experience is the inward expression of outward events and processes: yet I do not 
have – and it seem to me that I cannot have – the slightest conception of how the 
physical, material sequences of touch and sensation and perception come alive in 
the non-material reality of felt, qualitative experience. This brings into sharp focus 
the primary aspect of the wonder of embodiment, upon which rests the 
corresponding wonder attaching to treatment– namely the incredible constitution of 
experience and even of the possibility of experience, by that subtly and minutely 
organised substance that we call flesh. 
 
Even before we come to the dazzling array of neural circuitry within which we take 
consciousness to be administered, if not exactly to reside, the possibility of 
continued animal life at all lies spectacularly in the visceral manifold lying within the 
chest and abdomen. These engines of circulation, respiration, and digestion cleave 
together in a complex coloured heap of flesh whose untidy, haphazard scrambling 
nonetheless conforms closely to a regular blueprint: it sustains all higher forms of 
air-breathing, warm-blooded, locomotive life. This gaudy pile, in equal measure 
revolting and wondrous to behold, is our inner permit to exist at all; without it our 
brains and sensory organs can neither function nor arise in the first place. It is the 
invisible boiler-room of fleshly life; and our life is a fleshly one. 
 
So the extraordinary fact of embodiment – of embodied human experience – is both 
immediate and inexhaustible. Recognising it knocks all the cynical stuffing out of us 
in an instant: yet for millennia art and philosophy – more recently joined by science 
– have been trying to explore it, more or less full-time, and their labours continue 
with no end clearly in mind, let alone within sight. 
 
Finally, then, the clinician may be consoled and inspired by recognising that both the 
most mundane, and the most arduous, of treatments equally involve embodied 
agency (both scientific and ethical), and agency is perhaps that manifestation of 
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embodiment that most provokes wonder. Both illness and treatment are – in 
different ways – organised disruptions to an existing ‘arrangement’ of the matter of 
which we are made. Treatment is not conceived in these terms, of course, but 
nonetheless materially that is what it comes to. Astoundingly, our ‘arrangements’ 
are patterned in ways so consistent that, as organisms, we can conform to a 
specification allowing us to come into the world, survive, beget offspring, and even 
come to a rudimentary understanding of what our patterns are meant to be and 
how they might be therapeutically restored or their disruptions palliated. In drawing 
on an understanding of this conformity, the fact and success of treatment invites a 
further level of wonderment. 
 
Yet still more worthy of wonder is the accident (unless one’s religious belief suggests 
otherwise) that at some level of increasing complexity amongst simpler, inert forms 
of matter an entirely new phenomenon emerges – consciousness, finding (so far as 
we know) its highest and perhaps only truly self-reflective form in embodied human 
nature. We are fantastically complex arrangements of very simple, lifeless, parts. 
How mere complexity gives rise to the inner reality of sensation – let alone 
experience and self-reflection, and the ability to ponder questions of wonder – is as 
much a philosophical as it is a scientific mystery: perhaps more so. Treatment is an 
intelligent, purposive, intentional and inter-personal activity. In the clinical 
consultation two intelligences – two emergences of intelligence from patterns of 
mere inert matter – jointly consider the problem that one of them has an altered 
experience. This is already astounding enough. But in treatment, they intervene in 
the pattern, in the arrangement of parts, hoping thereby to intervene in the 
experience. In recognising this, we are drawn to further wonder. And in recognising 
this – this ‘drawing to wonder’ – we open the door to ontological wonder:[55] 
wonder at ourselves, our agency and, indeed, our own capacity to wonder at all. 
 
Like all other human agency, the doctor’s agency is after all an embodied one. 
Fluency in decisive acting; keenly-honed perception underlying judgment [footnote 
7]; the ‘cool intimacy’ 57,58] of interpersonal proximity; virtuosity and grace in 
clinical procedure, endless improvisation within a standard repertoire of 
performance (general practice has been described as the ‘jazz of medicine’ [footnote 
8]): each of these bespeaks an embodied agency that is fundamental to patient and 
doctor alike. Because this is how our world is, the mode of our experience, it is 
ordinarily silent, invisible, taken-for-granted. Only exceptionally does it become the 
focus of our attention – in art and philosophy where we acknowledge its mystery, or 
in clinical medicine where we seek to adjust or restore its smooth working. 
Embodied agency is both the means and the object of the doctor’s professional 
attention – uncanny as well as commonplace; extraordinary as well as routine. Faced 
with it, the proper attitude of the clinician is to combine intelligence with a proper 
form of reverence: an attitude neither of terrified awe at responsibility, nor of 
                                                     
7 Cf. Kathleen Jamie’s description of a meticulous clinical examination of her 
husband, suffering from pneumonia. [60] 
8 This remark is widely attributed to Marshall Marinker, for instance by Per Fugelli in 
his keynote lecture to the 17th Nordic Congress for General Practice, 2011. 
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immobile marvelling at the incomprehensible, but of dynamic, transfiguring wonder 
in the face of shared embodiment. When the doctor addresses the patient’s 
wonderful fragility she also, and thereby, re-engages with her own. 
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